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Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the political and social context of the recent 
nationalistic trend in Japan in connection with the historical development of 
Japanese self-image. In Japanese modern history this self-image was formed 
in relation to modern Europe due to the fact that modern Japan first pursued 
the modernization of Europe and then tried to overtake it. The first goal of this 
paper is to provide an analysis of the formation process of Japanese self-image 
from a historical perspective. This process was divided in three phases which 
were connected with a changing understanding of Japanese modernity. It start-
ed with the criticism of the idea of European modernity in the 1940s and led, 
through the theory of modernization, to the development of the “theory of Jap-
anese culture” (Nihonbunkaron) in the 1980s. The second goal of this paper is to 
conduct an analysis of the features of Japan’s society, economy, and politics since 
the 1990s. The links between the collapse of the “Bubble Economy” and a rise 
in nationalism are shown. Although the article focuses on the domestic issues 
of Japan, it also reflects Japanese understanding of modern Europe and con-
tributes to the understanding of cultural exchange between Europe and Japan.
Key words: Japanese self-image, Japanese modernity, European modernity, na-
tionalism, Japanese history education
INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2006, under the government of Abe Shinzō (安倍晋三) 
one of the most important legal acts in Japan, namely the Fundamental 
Law of Education (教育基本法 Kyōiku Kihonhō), was revised. From the very 
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beginning, a draft of the revision bill was vigorously opposed by people 
who feared the destruction of the democratic educational system. They 
were afraid that the revised law compelled students to develop a “patri-
otic spirit”, a “love for Japanese culture” and “Japanese tradition” regard-
ed by the opposition as the revival of the Imperial Rescript on Education 
(教育勅語 Kyōiku Chokugo) that formed the basis of the Japanese system of 
military education before the Second World War. Indeed, there is no doubt 
that Article 2 of the proposed law prescribed that virtues such as “love for 
Japanese culture” and “Japanese tradition” were an important competency 
to learn. In contemporary Japan, under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who 
returned to power in 2012, this political trend is continuously developing. 
It may be even said that during the Abe administration, ethnocentric na-
tionalism has also been strengthened in Japan in reaction to globalization. 
The aim of this article is to explain the political context of this recent 
trend in connection with the historical development of Japanese self-image 
in the modern age. In my opinion, a national self-image reflects political 
and social trends. However, it must be emphasized that the Japanese have 
tried to create such self-images with greater eagerness than other nations 
in modern times (Nihon Kagakusha Kaigi Shisō-Bunka Kenkyū Iinkai, 1991, 
pp. 35−88; Befu, 1997, pp. 36−67). In Japanese modern history this self-im-
age was formed entirely in relation to developments in Europe, as modern 
Japan was pursuing the modernization of Europe and would try to over-
take it at some point in the future. In other words, for the Japanese the 
concept of “modernity” was synonymous with the idea of modern Europe 
and, at the same time, an abstract goal to be achieved. Therefore, since 
the Meiji era, the Japanese have considered “modernity” as an object of 
discussion, and tried to understand it in the current situation and context. 
In such means, even though this article would explain the domestic issues 
of Japan, it also reflects Japanese understanding of modern Europe. Thus, 
the aim of the article is to contribute to understanding one of the aspects 
of cultural exchange between Europe and Japan.
HISTORICAL PROCESS OF THE FORMATION  
OF JAPANESE SELF-IMAGES
In order to investigate the reasons why nowadays conservative Japanese 
politicians, scholars or journalists intentionally emphasize the value of 
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“Japanese culture” and “Japanese tradition”, it is necessary to trace the 
historical process of the formation of Japanese self-image, and to analyze 
the character of its current mode of expression. For this purpose, it may 
be useful to look into the “theory of Japanese culture” (日本文化論 Nihon-
bunkaron), which appeared in the 1980s, in connection with its political 
and economic background. This theory has strongly influenced the crea-
tion of Japanese self-image. However, it must be emphasized that different 
Japanese self-images, such as those present in the “theory of Japanese cul-
ture”, had emerged in modern Japanese history many times from the Meiji 
period (1868–1912) on.
One helpful source in analyzing the historical process of the formation 
of self-images is the article 「歴史学と『近代』」 (Rekishigaku to “Kindai”) 
written by the Japanese historian Nishikawa Masao (西川正雄). He looked 
for the answer as to how Japanese intellectuals have considered Japanese 
modernity starting with the Meiji period, especially in connection with the 
criticism of the idea of modern Europe (Nishikawa, 1987, pp. 149−175). 
Based on his analysis, I believe that three phases in the history of ex-
change between Europe and Japan are important for interpreting the pro-
cess of the formation of the present Japanese self-image: the phase since 
1942, which was the attempt at “overcoming Modernity” (近代の超克 
Kindai no Chōkoku); the phase comprising the 1960s when the “Theory 
of Modernization” (近代化論 Kindaikaron) was developed; and the phase 
comprising the 1980s when the “Theory of Japanese culture” (日本文化論 
Nihonbunkaron) was established and the idea of “Internationalization” 
(国際化 Kokusaika) was developed.
The first phase, namely that since 1942, has been described as an at-
tempt at overcoming modernity （近代の超克 Kindai no Chōkoku). It be-
gan with a discussion about the Greater East Asia War (大東亜戦争 Daitōa 
Sensō) and advocacy of the “Japanese spirit”, as well as Japanese mo-
dernity compared with that of the West (Sakai, 2010, pp. 3–30; Isomae, 
2010, pp. 31−73). In this case, as the West was a synonym for modernity, 
the real goal was the creation of an original Japanese modernity through 
overcoming European models. The influential intellectuals of that time, 
such as philosophers, historians and the literary men of the Kyōto School 
(京都学派 Kyōto Gakuha), the members of the Literary Circle (文学界 Bun-
gakukai) and the Japanese Romantic School (日本ロマン派 Nihon Roman 
Ha) were involved in discussing the above ideas (Takeuchi, 1979, p. 288). 
These groups held a symposium on “Overcoming Modernity” on 23 and 
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24 July 1942 in Kyōto, and published notes about the symposium, as well 
as some articles related to this topic in the September and October issues 
of the journal Literary Circles 『文学界』 (Kawakami, 1979, pp. 165−168; 
Kawakami & Takeuchi, 1979, pp. 171−271). 
During the symposium, representatives of the above-mentioned 
groups brought into question the deep acceptance of European modernity 
existing since the Meiji era. In their view, the Japanese people had decided 
to introduce the European idea of modernity during the Meiji era, because 
Europe seemed to have superiority in developing scientific techniques and 
their practical use (Nakamura, 1979, pp. 150ff). However, after Japanese 
society and policy began to face various crises from 1930 onwards, the 
above-mentioned groups of intellectuals attributed these problems to this 
concept of modernity and, as a result, organized the symposium in 1942 
to overcome them (Kamei, 1979, pp. 4−17; Nishitani, 1979, pp. 32ff; Shi-
momura, 1979, pp. 112ff). 
Certainly, their ideological point of view was strongly connected with 
the idea of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (大東亜共栄圏 
Daitōa Kyōeiken) and the Japanese invasive war in Asia. After the Second 
World War, the cultural theorist Takeuchi Yoshimi (竹内好) reconsidered 
the attempt at “Overcoming Modernity”, and criticized the simple dichot-
omy between Japanese and European concepts of modernity. His idea was 
fully introduced in an article from 1979 entitled 「近代の超克」“Kindai 
no Chōkoku” (“Overcoming Modernity”). In his view, these intellectuals 
should consider the crisis of Japanese modernity as an internal Japanese 
issue independent of European origins (Takeuchi, 1979, pp. 275−341).
The second phase started in the 1960s when the theory of moderniza-
tion appeared. This was related to the American strategy during the Cold 
War and, in this context, the excellence of Japan and Japanese culture 
was advocated. The USA regarded the Japanese rapid economic growth 
as a successful model of modernization – a success which was hitherto 
an attribute of Western countries – and attempted to use the economic 
growth of Japanese society as an instrument that flaunted the superiority 
of a capitalistic state over socialism (Nishikawa, 1987, pp. 157−163). The 
theory of modernization provided an opportunity to make a positive eval-
uation of modern history. The positive evaluation of one’s own history, the 
process of rapid economic growth and the recognition of Japan through-
out the USA as a successful model of modernization, caused big changes in 
the formation of Japanese self-image. 
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The third phase started in the 1980s and brought about the devel-
opment of the theory of Japanese culture. At that time, a report entitled 
“The Age of Culture” (文化の時代 Bunka no jidai) was published by the 
Policy Research Group of the Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (大平正芳) 
(大平総理の政策研究会 Ōhira Sōri no Seisaku Kenkyūkai) (Kawamura, 
1982, pp. 143ff). This report expressed the idea that Japan had given up its 
own culture and traditions while it had been trying to pursue Western and 
industrial states as a model in the age of modernization, westernization, in-
dustrialization and economic growth. However, this situation has changed, 
in that since 1980s the time has come to reevaluate the characteristics of 
Japanese culture. Although at first glance, it looks similar to the period 
of activity described as the attempt at “Overcoming Modernity” from the 
1940s on, there are important differences. Firstly, it reflected the political 
and social situation of the 1980s, which was strongly connected to the rap-
id development of the Japanese economy since the 1960s. The econom-
ic power of Japan grew and the country overcame two “oil shocks” with 
the help of rationalization and Japanese-type management (日本型経営 
Nihongata keiei) (Watanabe, 2004, pp. 98ff). As a result, Japan gained con-
fidence as an economic power and no longer wished to regard Western 
countries as a model.
In 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro (中曽根康弘) became prime minister and 
introduced neoliberal policies under the slogan of “The Total Settlement of 
Postwar Politics” (戦後政治の総決算 Sengo Seiji no Sōkkesan) (Watanabe, 
2004, pp. 115ff). The theory of Japanese culture appeared under his gov-
ernment, together with the international strategy of Japanese capitalism. 
This theory was embodied in the establishment of the International Re-
search Center for Japanese Studies (国際日本文化研究センタ Kokusai Ni-
hon Bunka Kenkyū Sentā) in Kyōto. The first head of this Institute, Umehara 
Takeshi (梅原猛) had already developed the theory of Japanese culture in 
the 1970s, namely Nihonbunkaron. He proposed a concept based on con-
tradictions between Japanese culture and European civilization and advo-
cated the originality of Japanese culture (Umehara, 1976, pp. 51ff). How-
ever, the rough and conflict-based character of his theory was criticized 
by some researchers in Japan and overseas, especially, the historian Kano 
Masanao (鹿野政直), who critically summarized the features of Umehara’s 
theory of Japanese culture in four points (Kano, 1988, pp. 234ff). The first 
concerned the process of Japanese strategic “Internationalization”. Accord-
ing to Kano, the theory mistakenly emphasized the self-awareness of the 
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Japanese nation to realize the concept of kokusaijin (国際人), which means 
“internationally-minded man” or “Japanese as a citizen of the world”. This 
means that “Internationalization” and “emphasis on Japanese self-aware-
ness” were two sides of the same coin. Secondly, it aimed to create the 
ideological future of Japan in the 21st century in which the theory of Nihon-
bunkaron would play a strategic role. Thirdly, the theory gave superiority 
to the economic aspect of society. Umehara’s theory too easily proposed 
Japanese society and “Japanese-type management” as a model for the 
world to follow based on the self-confidence of Japanese “success” and 
the result of being “an economic power”. Fourthly, Umehara’s theory tried 
to find the origin of Japanese culture as being far from the mythos of the 
Emperor (天皇 Tennō). This was in opposition to the former Japanese na-
tionalistic theories in modern Japan that were mostly based on the mythos 
of the Japanese Emperor. Moreover, Umehara’s theory attempted to em-
phasize the complex character of Japanese culture and its positive attitude 
toward the reception of foreign culture, in contrast with the former theo-
ries that emphasized Japanese national and cultural purity. However, the 
problem which Kano Masao noticed and criticized was the fact that while 
Umehara proposed the opening of Japanese culture to the world, he pro-
posed at the same time the establishing of a nationalistic Japanese culture, 
one which should be an expression of Japanese national identity.
JAPAN AFTER THE “THEORY OF JAPANESE CULTURE” 
(NIHONBUNKARON)
As already mentioned, the “theory of Japanese culture” (Nihonbunkaron) 
appeared in connection with the self-confidence of conservative politicians 
and business groups. The Japanese economy, which by now had achieved 
its highest level of development, brought about an unusual level of specu-
lation in real estate from the second half of the 1980s to the beginning of 
1990s, known as the “Bubble Economy”. During this time the superiority 
of Japanese-type economies was advocated. However, once the “Bubble 
Economy” collapsed, the situation of the Japanese economy changed com-
pletely. After the collapse, Japan’s economy suffered from a long-term re-
cession that was known as the “lost 10 years” or “lost 20 years”. This new 
economic situation had also an influence on the discourse of the theory of 
Japanese culture that had drawn great attention in the 1980s. Therefore, 
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I would like to investigate the impact of this new economic situation on 
the discourse of the theory of Japanese culture and how it has been re-
lated to ethnocentric nationalism since the 1990s.
If one attempts to clarify the reason why “culture” and “tradition” are 
so strongly emphasized in present-day Japan, it is necessary to analyze 
more concretely the Japanese political and social situation in the 1990s. 
Whereas it is obvious that the years 1989/1990 marked the beginning of 
a new epoch in modern world history, this time was also important for 
Japan. Emperor Hirohito (Showa Tennō 昭和天皇), who was the symbol of 
Japanese national identity, died in January 1989. The emperor’s death and 
the resulting series of ceremonies involving the imperial family made a sig-
nificant impression on Japanese society since emperor-based ideology was 
deep-rooted in society. It seems that the death of the charismatic Hiro-
hito basically changed the political and social position of the emperor and 
his role in the discourse about Japanese culture and tradition (Watanabe, 
1990, pp. 370−414). 
On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the 
global market changed the Japanese position in American strategic think-
ing. Although the USA had not demanded a large share of military expenses 
from Japan during the Cold War, it changed this policy after that period. This 
was symbolically visible, especially during the Gulf War in 1990. Although 
the Japanese government paid a total of $11 billion to the multinational 
forces at that time, Japan was not only praised, but also criticized for the 
fact that it had only contributed financially while not undertaking an appro-
priate military burden. Under the influence of this situation, the Japanese 
government and conservative politicians started to look to the overseas 
expansion of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. A way to ensure a military pres-
ence overseas was desirable for the Japanese multinational corporations 
which had started full-scale overseas expansion since the second half of 
the 1980s (Watanabe, 2007, pp. 289−329). Moreover, after the collapse 
of the “Bubble Economy”, the Japanese economy fell into recession. How-
ever, the recession in 1990s had its own background, which the political 
scientist Watanabe Osamu (渡辺治) described as follows: 
The system that supported Japanese economic development was fundamen-
tally dependent on the policy of intervention by the state. The government 
implemented measures to redistribute the profit through the public works sys-
tem under the control of the Liberal Democratic Party. The system included 
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the working class organized into labor unions in particular companies. How-
ever, the system hindered the overseas expansion of Japanese corporations 
in 1990s and brought about the recession. During the rise of Asian countries, 
especially China, the Japanese economy required liberalization, rationalization, 
efficiency, and at last, conversion from Japanese-type management. (Wata-
nabe, 2005, pp. 252ff) 
In this way, Japanese society was confronted with great changes which 
exerted an influence on the creation of a Japanese self-image of that time. 
In this situation, the theory of Japanese culture, which from the 1980s rep-
resented pride in being Japanese, lost its significance rapidly. Instead of 
this, the trend of narrow-minded nationalism appeared.
The source of this new nationalistic trend was the fact that three for-
mer Korean “comfort women” (従軍慰安婦 jūgun ianfu) had brought a le-
gal suit against the Japanese government in December 1991. The Japanese 
government did not accept the charge that the government and the army 
should share the responsibility for this crime against humanity. As a result, 
an apology was postponed by the Japanese government for over 50 years.
However, in early 1992, a Japanese historian, Yoshimi Yoshiaki (吉見義明), 
found hitherto unknown government documents. This newly found evi-
dence made it clear that the Japanese military had played a direct role in 
setting up the “comfort stations”. After that, the Japanese government re-
versed the official position and admitted that the government had played 
a crucial role in the system of providing “comfort women” (Yoshimi, 1995, 
pp. 5ff). On this occasion, it became finally possible not to erase the de-
scription of “comfort women” from the history textbooks of junior high 
schools by the Ministry of Education anymore. This was the fact which influ-
enced Japanese education system, later becoming an important part of it. 
Such condemnation of Japanese war crimes was opposed by the right-
wing opposition, which aimed to ensure the revision of modern Japanese 
history. They denied the existence of the former Korean “comfort women”, 
as well as “Nanjing Massacre”, and perceived both as the “self-tormenting 
view of history” (自虐史観 jigyakushikan), one which exaggerates the dark 
side of history. The right-wing opposition persisted in promoting the neces-
sity of emphasizing the achievements of modern Japan as an independent 
state, as well as the fact that the Japanese should have pride in their own 
history. They also justified former Japanese military operations as a strug-
gle for the liberation of Asia.
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At the same time, the “revisionists” from the right-wing, who had 
declared the “neoliberal conception of history” (新自由主義史観 Shin 
Jiyūshugi Shikan), tried to change the description of history in the histo-
ry textbooks for Japanese junior high schools. They organized a so-called 
“Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform” (新しい教科書をつくる会 
Atarashii Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai) in 1996 and wrote their own textbook. 
The textbook focused on the history of emperors and exaggerated their 
mythos to legitimize their rule. Moreover, while it covered numerous acts 
of “great persons” such as politicians or military commanders, the so-
cial history of ordinary people was left out. Thus, “Japanese history” and 
“Japa nese culture” were glorified by the revisionists. It is significant that 
the Ministry of Education ultimately approved this textbook for classroom 
use after correcting many factual errors. Therefore, it has been used by 
some schools since 2001 (Gordon, 2003, p. 332). In consequence, the right-
wing revisionist vision of history influences not only education but also the 
process of creating a Japanese self-image.
TODAY’S JAPANESE NATIONALISM IN CONNECTION  
WITH POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
In this section, I would like to analyze the political, social and educational 
situation in which present-day conservative politicians and leading financi-
ers advocate a vision of Japanese culture and tradition based on the new 
aggressive nationalism discussed above.
As I have already mentioned, the end of the year 2006 brought the 
revision of the Fundamental Law of Education. This law obligated all Japa-
nese students to develop a “patriotic spirit” as well as a “love for Japanese 
culture and Japanese tradition”. It was criticized because of its similarity 
to the former Imperial Rescript on Education, which was promulgated un-
der the name of Emperor Meiji in October 1890 and had attached great 
importance to Confucian values such as “loyalty”, “obedience” and “fel-
lowship”. It demanded the obedience to the Japanese state, the emperor 
and his ancestors. In this way, education supported Japanese militarism. 
While many educators, scholars and journalists considered the revision 
of the Fundamental Law of Education only as a revival of the former Impe-
rial Rescript on Education, it also had a second aim. The revision aimed to 
introduce the principle of competition into a Japanese education system 
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that had supported the principle of equality among pupils for a long time. 
It was a tool to accomplish the strategy of the Japanese government to 
establish a science and technology-oriented nation, and to tighten control 
on education. 
Even if the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education had been 
a strong desire of nationalistic politicians for a long time, it was remarkable 
that the government had never put this desire into practice until 2006. In that 
respect, it is important to analyze why the revision of the Fundamental Law 
of Education became an actual political issue at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Even though the supporters of this revision were looking back to 
the former Imperial Rescript on Education in a nostalgic manner, we should 
not understand this revision only in a historical context as it was strongly 
connected to Japanese politics and the economic situation at the time. 
The situation of Japanese society changed drastically after the reces-
sion in the 1990s. Japanese social awareness of a so-called “100 million 
total middle-class society” (一億総中流社会 ichioku sōchūryū shakai) had 
been already lost. According to an inquiry made by the Ministry of Educa-
tion in 2005, the number of the elementary schoolchildren who were una-
ble to pay their school lunch expenses reached 40,000, while the total sum 
used to support them reached 200 million yen. In present-day Japan, the 
number of people who need an allowance from the government has rap-
idly increased, while at the same time this allowance was drastically cut. 
One serious problem is the increasing number of non-regular workers, es-
pecially among the young generation. The words like “freeter” (フリーター) 
or “NEET” (ニート) were coined to reflect such a situation in Japan. The 
word “freeter” was formed from the term “Freelance Arbeiter”, and 
“NEET” from the expression “Not in Education, Employment or Training”. 
An increase in the numbers of the poor and needy is a serious social prob-
lem (Honda, Naitō & Gotō, 2006, pp. 16–20). As a result, the Japanese self-
image started to change speedily.
Simultaneously, this self-image is also connected to political changes in 
contemporary Japan. One example may be an attempt of the government 
to amend Article 9 of the constitution, which outlawed war as means of 
settling international disputes involving the state. However, this clause is 
inconsistent with the demand of the Japanese business community which 
may need military protection when Japanese companies expand into coun-
tries that are politically instable (Watanabe, 2005, pp. 170–193). In this 
situation, the question arises as to how this strategy supported by the Abe 
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government would be related to the emphasis on Japanese culture and tra-
dition. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the 
emphasis of Japanese culture and tradition in a political and social context. 
Therefore, we can refer to a book Healing Nationalism 『癒しのナショ 
ナリズム』 (Iyashi no Nashonalizmu) written by the historical sociologist, 
Oguma Eiji (小熊英二) (Oguma & Ueno, 2003, pp. 188–223). Having ana-
lyzed who had supported the revisionist movement since 1990s, in Oguma 
Eiji’s view these people do not always assert their xenophobic nationalism 
clearly. The keyword of his concept of nationalism was “healing” (癒し), 
which can be summarized in the political context described below.
While Prime Minister Abe is known as a conservative politician, at the 
same time, he promotes a neo-liberal policy that had been continued since 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (小泉純一郎) under a slogan of “reform” 
(kaikaku 改革) (Watanabe, 2005, pp. 60–130). For instance, these policies 
included the “Relaxation of Economic Regulation or Protectionism”, such as 
the privatization of Japan Post, the “Reduction of Social Security Expenses”, 
and the “Hard-fought Free Competitive Market”. As a result, a society with 
a largest gap between rich and poor in Japanese history appeared. How-
ever, there is no contradiction between neo-liberal economic reform and 
conservative education system reform that not only emphasizes culture 
and tradition but also reinforces state control. Since it was impossible to 
mitigate the damage by social policies or welfare, nationalism was needed 
to conceal a divided Japanese society. This healing nationalism could play 
the “healing” role through creating a feeling of identity with the state for 
a now-divided Japanese society. For example, when the first Abe cabinet 
was formed in 2006, it promoted Japan as a “beautiful state” (美しい国 
utsukushii kuni), whose “beauty” is based on having arisen from Japanese 
culture and traditions in connection with the rule of the emperor. This idea 
was incorporated into the Japanese curriculum starting already in junior 
high schools. Thus, the danger of the development of nationalistic way of 
thinking and creating a strongly nationalistic Japanese self-image appeared. 
As already mentioned, Abe’s idea has been criticized by Umehara Takeshi, 
among others. Even though he was an advocate of the vision of Japanese 
culture which is close to Abe’s idea of Japan as a “beautiful state” based 
on an emphasis on Japanese culture and tradition, he pointed out that 
amending the constitution would strengthen the idea of a militant Japan.
Summing up, there is almost no other nation like the Japanese who try 
to paint their own portrait in such a positive light. In other words, Japanese 
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society is sensitive in terms of its self-image and looks like being psychologi-
cally insecure in relation to Western countries. This article has tried to show 
this through analyzing its development during three phases. It concludes 
that in the last phase, since the collapse of the “Bubble Economy” in the 
1990s, exclusivist nationalism has started to grow. However, in my opinion, 
Japanese society should not express a narcissistic self-love, but look for an 
objective self-portrait. Thus, in the face of Japanese exclusive nationalism 
it is necessary to rethink the value of the European concept of modernity. 
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